ANTICIPATORY REPUDIATION: A CLEAR BARRIER
TO COMMUNICATION
Garth E. Flygare*

I. INTRODUCTION
A subcontractor was involved in a construction project, renovating a
series of restrooms for a school district.1 Things were not exactly going
according to plan, and the architect’s project manager was unsatisfied with
some of the work. The subcontractor was involved in the application of a
high performance paint coating, and its speckled color was slightly different
from the manufacturer’s sample.
The architect’s project manager stated in a written evaluation that
changes were necessary to correct the problems, but what she did not realize
was that the expense involved in the process of preparing the surface and
reapplying the coating would be substantial. The particular coating system
was only produced in limited production runs, and this only occurred when
the individual orders were in sufficient numbers to warrant the production.
The subcontractor knew at that time that if he did the requested additional
work his business would lose quite a bit of money and that the specific color
concern would be unlikely to improve. On the other hand, if he refused to
do the work, he would not have fulfilled his responsibilities under the
contract.
Burdened with what seemed like a lose-lose situation, the subcontractor
went to the general contractor’s office and spoke with the project manager
about the concerns of the architect’s project manager. The subcontractor
explained the situation and his difficult position. The subcontractor did not
know what to do. He did not want to lose money, and he did not want to
cause any problems that might affect his relationship with the general
contractor. He had already worked as a subcontractor successfully with that
company on several other projects, and their relationship was relatively solid.
He told the general contractor about all of his concerns, including the
financial aspects, the production issues, and the marginal improvement
potential of the additional work.
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However, the conversation took an interesting turn at one point, when
the general contractor’s project manager paused and plainly asked the
subcontractor, “Are you saying you cannot fulfill your end of the contract?”
When he asked that question the subcontractor paused as well, because it
seemed like the entire tone of the conversation had changed. He answered
him, “No, I just wanted a little help.”
Following that conversation, a meeting took place on location at the
project site, and together the parties worked out their issues. The architect’s
project manager clarified her concerns that were, in actuality, limited to a few
specific areas of the renovation as opposed to the entire coating system as
indicated on the previous written notice. The additional work was possible
with the remaining product that the subcontractor had on location, and it was
limited in scope, so that any additional labor cost was minimized as well.
What the subcontractor did not know at the time is that this was his very
first introduction to the concept of anticipatory repudiation. He was not
inexperienced with contracts at that time, and he was attempting to work with
the other relevant parties in good faith. He had a good relationship with both
the architectural firm and the general contractor. He was trying to
communicate with all parties in order to work out a solution to a problem. It
was his assumption that each party had a specific concern, and each other
party was probably not fully aware of the concerns of everyone else.
The consequences for his ignorance regarding anticipatory repudiation
could have been extreme. If he had misspoken or made a regrettable
statement in the context of a heated discussion, the entire situation could have
turned on its head. He could have been punished for what was originally
intended to be an open attempt at communication to solve a problem.
Although the above business interaction is not directly covered by
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), as it is not related to
the sale of goods,2 the account above serves as a good example of the kinds
of problems that can arise when dealing with the concept of anticipatory
repudiation under the U.C.C. The account above ended with a mutually
beneficial conclusion, but that outcome was the product of communication
and working together. Without the established relationship and the
motivation to communicate and succeed, the events could have easily taken
a turn for the worse.3
The formulation of anticipatory repudiation under the U.C.C. stands as
a disincentive to communication between parties when future performance is
called into question. In order to fully understand anticipatory repudiation,
this Comment will review the history of anticipatory repudiation, and it will
discuss how anticipatory repudiation is set up under the framework of the
2.
3.

U.C.C. § 2-102 (2013).
See id. § 2-609(4).
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U.C.C. This Comment will also discuss how the U.C.C. discourages
communications when a party faces difficulty or uncertainty regarding that
party’s ability to perform, and how a non-repudiating party faces a similar
disincentive when the other party repudiates an obligation under an
agreement. Finally, this Comment will address why the barrier to
communication, caused by anticipatory repudiation, is contrary to optimum
business interactions.
II. BACKGROUND
The history and framework of anticipatory repudiation under the U.C.C.
are necessary to understand the importance of the concept in present day
contract law. The specific examples of how courts have applied anticipatory
repudiation are also instructive as a guideline for the expectations of
businesses operating under the U.C.C.
A. The History of Anticipatory Repudiation
Anticipatory repudiation is the term associated with the occurrence
when one party refuses to honor its obligations under a contract prior to the
time at which performance is due.4 It has an extensive history both in the
common law, and, as it evolved and reached a point of codification, among
the laws of the several states and internationally.5
As early as the 1700’s, the concept of anticipatory repudiation was
found in British courts.6 By the middle of the 1800’s it was found in
American courts as well, and American scholars had already given the
concept recognition in legal writing.7 Although early treatment focused more
intently on situations in which the breaching party made actions inconsistent
with the continued ability to perform under a contract, the idea was clearly
recognized, nonetheless.8 By 1916, the doctrine of anticipatory repudiation
had even reached the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court held, in Central
Trust Co. of Illinois v. Chicago Auditorium Ass’n, that the doctrine of
anticipatory repudiation was already well-established.9
In 1932, anticipatory repudiation was included in the first Restatement
of Contracts.10 It was later included in the U.C.C., and eventually the
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Id. § 2-610; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 250 (1981).
CHARLES L. KNAPP, NATHAN M. CRYSTAL & HARRY G. PRINCE, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 834 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 7th ed. 2012).
Keith A. Rowley, A Brief History of Anticipatory Repudiation in American Contract Law, 69 U.
CIN. L. REV. 565, 576 (2001).
Id. at 572.
Id. at 572 n.35.
Id. at 572 (citing Cent. Trust Co. of Ill. v. Chi. Auditorium Ass’n, 240 U.S. 581, 589 (1916)).
Id. at 609.
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Restatement (Second) of Contracts included it as well, along with the changes
that arose in the U.C.C.11 This doctrine even achieved international
recognition when it was adopted in 1987 as part of the United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods.12
B. The Anticipatory Repudiation Framework Under the Uniform
Commercial Code
Article 2 of the U.C.C. provides a non-repudiating party a few options
when the other party repudiates an obligation under a contract before the
repudiating party’s performance is due.13 Under section 2-610 of the U.C.C.,
when a party repudiates, the other party can:
(a) for a commercially reasonable time await performance by the
repudiating party; or
(b) resort to any remedy for breach (section 2-703 or section 2-711), even
though he has notified the repudiating party that he would await the latter’s
performance and has urged retraction; and
(c) in either case suspend his own performance or proceed in accordance
with the provisions of this Article on the seller’s right to identify goods to
the contract notwithstanding breach or to salvage unfinished goods (section
2-704).14

In addition to either waiting for performance or resorting to remedies, a nonrepudiating party has another option.15 Under section 2-609 of the U.C.C., a
party has the option of requesting adequate assurances of performance from
the other party if there are reasonable grounds to question the other party’s
future performance.16 If the other party does not provide adequate assurances
within a reasonable time, not exceeding thirty days, then that failure to
provide assurance constitutes a breach.17 The purpose of this section is to
maintain the sense of security that should be inherent in any contract, that
each party will dutifully perform his obligations when due.18
Where section 2-609 speaks to the uncertainty of performance, section
2-610 refers to situations in which an overt communication or action takes
place, which reasonably indicates that performance will not occur.19
Basically, there are three distinct situations that these two sections identify as
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 616–25.
Id. at 629–30 n.368 (becoming effective on January 1, 1988).
U.C.C. § 2-610 (2013).
Id.
See id. § 2-609.
Id. § 2-609(1).
Id. § 2-609(4).
Id. § 2-609 cmt. 1.
Id. § 2-610 cmt. 1–2.
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possibly constituting a repudiation. The first is when a party makes an overt
communication that indicates future non-performance.20 The second is when
a party takes an action which reasonably indicates that future performance
will not occur.21 The final situation is when a party fails to give adequate
assurances in a reasonable amount of time after reasonable grounds for
questioning future performance manifest, and such a request is made.22
Both sections provide an option for the non-repudiating party; the
language indicates that the non-repudiating party “may” do the certain
specific options provided.23 Nothing in these sections is mandatory for the
non-repudiating party.
It should be noted, however, that section 2-611 does provide the ability
to retract a repudiation by the repudiating party.24 Such a retraction must be
made prior to the time when performance is due and before the nonrepudiating party has materially changed its position.25 Such a retraction
excuses any consequences of the non-repudiating party’s suspended
performance as well.26
Additionally, the ability of the repudiating party to retract its
repudiation is completely dependent on the actions taken by the nonrepudiating party.27 For example, if the non-repudiating party has canceled
the contract or acquired substitute performance elsewhere, then the
repudiating party has no right to retract its repudiation, regardless of the
relative extent of time between the moment that such retraction is given and
the time at which performance is due.28 In effect, what appears to be an
option on the part of the repudiating party is instead subject to the option of
the non-repudiating party.29
C. Examples of Repudiation and the Secret Intent to Repudiate
Knowing the framework within which this concept operates is
important to perform a proper analysis, but another element that should be
examined is when the applicability of anticipatory repudiation has been
recognized. The U.C.C. does not specifically define circumstances
constituting anticipatory repudiation.30 Instead, case law provides a guide to
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. § 2-610 cmt. 1.
Id. § 2-610 cmt. 2.
Id. § 2-609(1).
Id. § 2-609(1); Id. § 2-610.
Id. § 2-611.
Id. § 2-611(1).
Id. § 2-611(3).
Id. § 2-611 cmt. 1.
Id.
Id.
Nat’l Farmers Org. v. Bartlett & Co., Grain, 560 F.2d 1350, 1355 (8th Cir. 1977) (applying Missouri
law).
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instances that qualify as anticipatory repudiation, as well as those instances
that do not.31
In determining whether the specific actions of a party constitute
anticipatory repudiation, a court can follow the U.C.C. framework detailed
above,32 understanding that a “[r]epudiation can take the form of an action
that ‘reasonably indicates’ that the party will not perform its contractual
obligation.”33 There are numerous examples of anticipatory repudiation that
extend beyond the simple, overt statement of one party, indicating that it will
not perform future obligations.
Conditioning one party’s future performance on the addition of
obligations to another party also qualifies as anticipatory repudiation.34 In
other words, when a party to an agreement refuses to perform unless a new
or modified agreement is formed, the party is stating that it will not perform
under the current agreement. Whether a separate agreement manifests in the
future is irrelevant. What is important here is how that party is treating the
current contract.
It is possible, however, for a party to request modifications to an
existing agreement without conditioning that party’s future performance on
the manifestation of such modifications.35 “Neither an attitude that suggests
more negotiations are sought nor requests to change the terms of a contract
are enough to constitute repudiation.”36 What this speaks to is the intention
of non-performance, and the communication of that intention.37 A simple
request to modify an agreement is a communication of unhappiness, but not
of unwillingness.38
An example of this type of request, and how it can cause confusion, can
be found in Tenavision, Inc. v. Neuman.39 In Tenavision, a nursing home
interpreted a request for particular forms from a television supplier, the
31.
32.
33.
34.

35.

36.
37.
38.
39.

4 DAVID FRISCH, LAWRENCE’S ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-610:11 (3d
ed. 2013).
See supra Part II.B.
FRISCH, supra note 31, § 2-610:12.
See PAMI-LEMB I, Inc. v. EMB-NHC, L.L.C., 857 A.2d. 998, 1014 (Del. Ch. 2004) (where one
party’s refusal to perform unless current terms of the partnership contract were changed was a
repudiation); see also Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. v. Brookhaven Manor Water Co., 532 F.2d
572, 583–84 (7th Cir. 1976) (where the seller demanded either a guarantee, financing held in
escrow, or an interest in the buyer entity before continued performance).
See In re Bridge Info. Sys., Inc., 327 B.R. 382, 387–88 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2005) (applying Missouri
law) (where a letter of intention to terminate a lease did not constitute anticipatory repudiation
because continued performance from both parties prevented damages); see also K & K Recycling,
Inc. v. Alaska Gold Co., 80 P.3d 702, 715–16 (Alaska 2003) (where one party requested government
approval, work plans, and various other conditions from the other party, a recycling company, but
made no indication that it would not perform in the absence of those conditions).
In re Bridge Info. Sys., Inc., 327 B.R. at 388 (applying Missouri law).
See id.
See id.
379 N.E.2d 1166 (N.Y. 1978).
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delivery of which was not in the original agreement, to be an indication of
that supplier’s anticipatory repudiation of the contract.40 However, the
supplier did not condition any performance on compliance with the request.41
The nursing home suspended performance after this communication.42 The
court held that, because the supplier’s communication did not qualify as a
repudiation, the nursing home’s suspension of performance was actually a
repudiation in itself.43
The situation in Tenavision sheds light on the fact that a communication,
mistaken as an intention of non-performance, can result in an aggrieved party
suspending performance and seeking damages. This behavior based on a
mistake is, in itself, an anticipatory repudiation of the contract, which means
that the party originally fearing non-performance could owe damages to the
other party.
Another form of mistake should be noted as well. If a communication
of non-performance takes place, and it is based off of a misunderstanding
concerning a term in the contract or a mistake, ambiguity, or incompleteness
in the contract, that communication does not constitute an anticipatory
repudiation.44 Instead, the parties must cure the defect in the agreement.45
As long as any renegotiations are done in good faith to cure the problem, the
communication should not be construed as repudiation of the contract.46
An additional situation that deserves special attention is once again
related to whether there exists an intention of non-performance, and whether
there is a communication of such an intention. In Unique Systems, Inc. v.
Zotos International, Inc., the court held that “[a] secret intention not to
perform or a negative attitude does not rise to the level of repudiation.”47
Without a communication or meaningful action relaying the intentions of the
repudiating party, there is no anticipatory repudiation.48 This case is
important, because it identifies the necessity of the second fundamental
requirement, the communication. Where the focus is usually on the nature
of the content in a communication, Unique Systems speaks to those situations
in which the intent may be clear, but the communication of the intent is not.

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 1167.
Id. at 1168.
Id. at 1167.
Id. at 1168.
Arthur Rosett, Partial, Qualified, and Equivocal Repudiation of Contract, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 93,
108 (1981).
Id.
Id.
622 F.2d 373, 377 (8th Cir. 1980) (applying Minnesota law) (citing Teeman v. Jurek, 251 N.W.2d
698 (Minn. 1977)).
Id. at 376–77.
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III. ANALYSIS
Anticipatory repudiation is a helpful tool for a contracting party when
that party is facing a clear intention of non-performance from the other party.
It helps the non-repudiating party avoid impending damages, and, in doing
so, it mitigates future damages that will be caused by an almost certain breach
of the contract. Anticipatory repudiation falls short when it stands as a barrier
to healthy communication between contracting parties.
Healthy
communication is important to business relationships, and, by standing as a
barrier, anticipatory repudiation causes businesses to make choices according
to an artificial prioritization that primarily considers contracts on a
transaction-to-transaction basis, while ignoring valuable business
relationships.
A. One-Sided Protection
If a situation arises that causes insecurity on the part of one party that a
repudiation exists or will shortly occur, section 2-609 of the U.C.C. offers the
insecure party the option to take action.49 Once a party makes a clear
communication of repudiation or fails to provide requested adequate
assurances to the other party of an agreement, anticipatory repudiation under
the U.C.C. offers the non-repudiating party the option to take action.50
These options are one-sided. The non-repudiating party has the right to
invoke protections, while the repudiating party does not.51 It might seem at
first that the repudiating party has full control over whether or not to make a
repudiating communication. The repudiating party similarly seems to have
full control over whether to provide adequate assurances when requested.
When analyzing the framework of the U.C.C., the options available to each
party are relatively evident, but in practice the situation is less clear.
When requesting adequate assurances, there is no specific language an
insecure party must incorporate into the written request.52 Additionally, the
insecure party may suspend performance, but it does not need to relay any
information relating to the suspension to the repudiating party.53
Additionally, the insecure party’s continued performance, by accepting
improper deliveries, does not constitute any acceptance of the current state
of the contract dealings.54

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

U.C.C. § 2-609(1) (2013).
Id. § 2-610.
Id. § 2-609(1).
See id. § 2-609.
Id. § 2-609(1).
Id. § 2-609(3).
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These requirements indicate that the party whose future performance is
in question may not know of the gravity of the situation. Without a
communication of the consequences of a failure to provide adequate
assurances, the alleged repudiating party could perceive the request for
adequate assurances as a request for the performance of an obligation outside
the scope of the original agreement.
Knowing that the request for adequate assurances is originating under
section 2-609 of the U.C.C., the party subject to such a request would be on
notice of the consequences of a failure to respond or would at least know the
basis for the request, and that party could make an informed response.
Without such notice, section 2-609 only provides a one-sided protection to
the requesting party.
Combining this with the fact that the insecure party can choose to
continue receiving improper deliveries and suspend performance secretly
until that party receives assurances, the alleged repudiating party has no
standard by which to measure the true position of the insecure party.55 If a
party cannot look to the writings and actions of another party to evaluate its
position in relation to that party, it cannot form a basis upon which to make
any determinations that would affect that relationship.
Knowing that the insecure party views the situation in such a serious
light is an important factor in the decision to provide adequate assurances.
Knowing that the insecure party has suspended performance until the alleged
repudiating party provides assurances is even more relevant in the decision.
Without this information and without a requirement to provide it, the alleged
repudiating party has no protection while the insecure party does.
When it comes to circumstances where a party has perceived an overt
communication of an intention of non-performance or when the alleged
repudiating party has failed to provide adequate assurances, a similar
situation arises, in which the repudiating party may not be on notice of the
non-repudiating party’s perception. Although section 2-611 provides a
repudiating party the opportunity to retract its repudiation,56 there is no
requirement for the non-repudiating party to notify the repudiating party that
it perceives circumstances which constitute a repudiation of obligations
under the agreement.57
The non-repudiating party has the option to encourage a retraction of
the repudiation and assure the repudiating party that it will await
performance, but, even in the case that the non-repudiating party provides
such encouragement and assurance, it may secretly pursue remedies for a
breach.58 This means a non-repudiating party can calm the concerns of the
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. § 2-609(1); Id. § 2-609(3).
Id. § 2-611.
See id.
Id. § 2-610(b).
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repudiating party and effectively indicate that the repudiating party has until
the time when performance is due to retract its repudiation, while at the same
time the non-repudiating party actually reserves the right to seek remedies at
any time prior to the time when performance is due.59
The U.C.C. protects the non-repudiating party by allowing it to reserve
the right to seek remedies. However, it effectively allows the non-repudiating
party to preserve its right to seek remedies through a communication that
may or may not be provided in actual good faith.60 A statement indicating
that the non-repudiating party will await performance is inherently designed
to create an expectation in the repudiating party. However, allowing the nonrepudiating party to seek remedies, while providing the repudiating party
with an expectation that the non-repudiating party intends to await
performance, creates a situation of uncertainty.
Once again, the repudiating party is in a position where it cannot look
to the actions or communications of the non-repudiating party in order to
establish some level of expectation after the non-repudiating party perceives
a repudiation. There is not a notice requirement when the non-repudiating
party perceives a repudiation,61 and the optional notice available under the
provisions does not carry an obligation to adhere to whatever statements the
non-repudiating party chooses to make.62 The repudiating party does not
have a standard by which to measure its position in relation to the nonrepudiating party, and, while the U.C.C. provides protection to the nonrepudiating party,63 it provides none here to the repudiating party64 and
effectively nullifies the ability to retract the repudiation.
Both in the instance of a request for adequate assurances and in the
instance of a perceived repudiation prior to the time at which performance is
due, the insecure or non-repudiating party receives a one-sided protection,
and the repudiating party (or the alleged repudiating party) is effectively
without protection.
B. Disincentive to Communication
Anticipatory repudiation is a disincentive to communication for both
parties to an agreement. The party whose performance may be in question
could potentially lose benefits under the agreement if the other party
interprets a communication as a repudiation, while the insecure or aggrieved
59.
60.

61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.
Compare U.C.C. § 1-304 (requiring obligations of good faith for the parties to a contract), with id.
§ 2-610(b) (allowing a non-repudiating party to seek remedies despite notifying a repudiating party
that remedies would not be sought).
See id. § 2-610.
Id.
Id.
See id. § 2-609; see also id. § 2-610.
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party could lose its ability to seek remedies under the U.C.C. if its
communication compels the repudiating party to retract its position.
1. Disincentive for the Repudiating Party to Communicate
When faced with a situation that would make performance of a future
obligation under an agreement difficult, a party to that agreement has a
decision to make. That party needs to determine whether to notify the other
party of the difficulty or to withhold the information and deal with the
difficulties as they arise. In order to make this determination, a review of the
party’s consequences in either situation is necessary.
The first option to review is that which involves communicating the
potential difficulty to the other party. There are positive outcomes that could
result from a communication with the other party. First, the other party could
receive the information as a beneficial, good-faith demonstration of the
party’s intention to work with the other party through any difficulties that
might arise. Then, the two parties could work together to identify a solution,
or, perhaps, the parties could renegotiate an alternative agreement in good
faith. This positive result could be expected from situations involving parties
with established relationships or those interested in fostering such
relationships.
The alternative result could carry negative consequences. If the other
party interprets the communication of impending difficulties regarding the
future performance of the potentially breaching party as a repudiation of
those obligations, then that party can seek remedies under section 2-610 of
the U.C.C.65 As discussed in the previous section, the party communicating
the potential difficulties would effectively invest certain rights in the other
party while subjecting itself to a state of insecurity. Because of the lack of a
notice requirement when a party perceives a repudiation from the other party,
a party facing difficulties also takes the chance of giving the wrong
impression to the other party, and, if it does so, it may never know of this
interpretation until after the other party has sought remedies.
Although a court will subject a communication of repudiation to
scrutiny and the non-repudiating party will not always prevail, the severity
of the consequences of a misinterpreted communication are quite extreme.
While on one hand the result of a communication could be a mutually
beneficial interaction, on the other hand the communication might lead to an
obligation to compensate the other party for a breach of contract. Thus,
communicating the information is a gamble.
When this information is combined with the holding in Unique Systems,
Inc. v. Zotos International, Inc., the decision to withhold communications is
65.

Id. § 2-610.
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more easily determined.66 As discussed earlier, “[a] secret intention not to
perform or a negative attitude does not rise to the level of repudiation.”67
Additionally, there is no duty to relay information about potential nonperformance.68 The fact that this secret intention of non-performance is
protected, while a communication is not protected, clearly indicates that the
interests of a party facing performance difficulties are better served if that
party chooses to withhold that information from the other party.
At least in terms of provisions contained in the U.C.C., there is no
incentive for a repudiating party to communicate the intention to repudiate.
There is not even an incentive to communicate a potential difficulty. While
there may be an incentive outside of the U.C.C. to communicate such
information, inside the U.C.C. there is none.
2. Disincentive for the Non-Repudiating Party to Communicate
When it comes to the non-repudiating or insecure party, a similar
disincentive exists, and an incentive for communicating misleading
information manifests as well. While a non-repudiating party does not
expose itself to the same vulnerabilities that a repudiating party does when it
communicates a state of affairs to the other party, the non-repudiating party
can compromise some rights that perceiving a repudiation may have granted.
As described previously, the anticipatory repudiation framework
provides a one-sided protection when the other party communicates a
repudiation or when there are sufficient conditions to reasonably create
insecurity in regard to the future performance of the other party. When an
insecurity manifests, the insecure party has a right to request adequate
assurances.69 A failure to respond appropriately, by the party of whom
adequate assurances are requested, can result in a repudiation.70 This
repudiation creates a right in the insecure party to seek remedies.71 The
perception of the other party’s intent to repudiate through the communication
of such an intent to the non-repudiating party creates the same right as well.72
The non-repudiating party’s disincentive to communicate exists in the
knowledge that certain communications can destroy the rights created in this
framework. There is no notice requirement for the non-repudiating party
under the U.C.C.,73 and, because of this, the non-repudiating party can
calculate the timeliness and content of any communications.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

See 622 F.2d 373 (8th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 377 (applying Minnesota law) (citing Teeman v. Jurek, 251 N.W.2d 698 (Minn. 1977)).
See U.C.C. § 2-610.
Id. § 2-609(1).
Id. § 2-609(4).
Id. § 2-610(b).
Id.
See id. § 2-610.
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Section 2-611(1) states that a party can retract a repudiation any time
before performance is due as long as the non-repudiating party has not
canceled the contract or materially changed its position.74 To effectively take
advantage of this provision, a non-repudiating party can calculate any
communications of notice that remedies will be sought to take place after the
non-repudiating party’s position has materially changed. If the nonrepudiating party makes a communication prior to this time, and the
repudiating party has an opportunity to retract its repudiation, then the nonrepudiating party will lose its right to seek remedies.75
Similarly, the non-repudiating or insecure party can calculate the
content of its communications, if it chooses to communicate, so as to prevent
disclosure of its intentions to seek remedies. For example, when an insecure
party requests adequate assurances, it can do so in a way that does not
disclose any intentions to seek remedies upon a failure by the other party to
provide the requested assurances. Doing otherwise could compel the party
whose performance is in question to provide false assurances, destroying the
rights of the insecure party to seek remedies.
A non-repudiating party can also calculate its communication to include
an intention to await performance from the repudiating party until the time at
which the performance is due.76 By doing this, the non-repudiating party can
discourage retractions of a repudiation, while maintaining its own rights to
seek remedies at any time prior to the time when the other party’s
performance of its obligations under the agreement is due.77
Although these are communications, they are not the healthy
communications that could positively affect the relationship between the
parties and lead to the mutual benefit originally contemplated in the
agreement. This type of calculated communication is fundamentally the
same as the absence of meaningful communications between parties. When
the communication of strategic or misleading information manifests in a
contractual relationship, the results are effectively the same as the destruction
of communication channels.
3. Suggestions for Overcoming the Disincentive to Communication
After identifying some of the problems that might negatively influence
communication between the parties of a contract, it seems appropriate to
review some of the past recommendations for changes to the U.C.C. In 1991,
a task force of the A.B.A. Subcommittee on General Provisions, Sales, Bulk
Transfers, and Documents of Title, of the Committee on the Uniform
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. § 2-611(1).
Id. § 2-611(3).
Id. § 2-610(b).
Id.
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Commercial Code, prepared a study of potential changes to the provisions of
article 2, part 6 of the U.C.C.78 The task force reviewed recommendations
prepared by a study committee and provided feedback and potential
amendments to the language of the official text.79
The study committee identified the importance of the “adequate
assurances” provision in section 2-609 and praised the section's facilitation
of dispute resolution.80 The task force, however, recommended the
allowance of oral requests (as opposed to only written requests) for adequate
assurances and a definition as to what constitutes “adequate assurances.”81
In regard to section 2-610, the study committee recommended various
minor changes for clarity but specifically encouraged a higher standard when
interpreting a communication to constitute a repudiation of future
performance.82 In the implementation of this change, the study committee
predicted that the adequate assurances of section 2-609 would be invoked
more commonly.83 The study committee also recommended a clarification
as to what actions, if any, the non-repudiating party could take that would be
inconsistent with a repudiation.84 However, the task force failed to respond
to these recommendations, and it failed to offer any other
recommendations.85
The study committee seems to have been on the right track to a certain
degree on both provisions, and the failure of the task force to adopt the
recommendations is questionable. While the study committee failed to
address issues in section 2-609 about adequate assurances, it identified a
potential method to encourage the use of the adequate assurances provision
found in section 2-609 by increasing the standard necessary for the
identification of a repudiation under section 2-610.86 If the non-repudiating
party has a harder time proving that the communication made by the other
party was actually a repudiation, then it would need to verify it through the
use of the adequate assurances provision of section 2-609.
Where the study committee’s determinations fall short is in how it
sought to encourage the use of the adequate assurances provision in section
2-609 by making it more appealing. If the use of the adequate assurances
provision is in fact a better way to ensure that communications are actually
78.

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Task Force of the A.B.A. Subcomm. on Gen. Provisions, Sales, Bulk Transfers, & Documents of
Title, Comm. on the U.C.C., Article 2, Part 6: Breach, Repudiation and Excuse, 16 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 1157, 1157 (1991).
Id. at 1203 n.1.
Id. at 1169–70.
Id. at 1170–71.
Id. at 1171–72.
Id. at 1171.
Id. at 1172.
Id. at 1173.
Id. at 1171–72.
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intentions of repudiation, then a mandatory request for adequate assurances
would sufficiently attain the same goal. It would also accomplish this goal
without the uncertainty presently found in section 2-610.87
The task force’s recommendation for a definition of adequate
assurances is helpful as well,88 but such an amendment should be
accompanied by a requirement that specific language is to be included in each
request for adequate assurances. This language should include both the
consequences for a failure to provide adequate assurances and a specific
citation to the applicable provisions of the U.C.C. In this way, the obligations
of both parties in regard to necessary and sufficient communications would
not be in question.
A summary of these recommendations for change urged by this
Comment are as follows:
First, when an insecurity or potential
communication of repudiation manifests within a contractual agreement, the
insecure, non-repudiating party must request adequate assurances. This
request for adequate assurances must include a notice of the consequences
for failure to reply and a reference to sections 2-609, 2-610, and 2-611 of the
U.C.C. Then, the party whose performance is in question must respond
within the specific time frame, and that response must include adequate
assurances as defined under section 2-609 of the U.C.C.
These changes would remove the disincentive to communicate under
the anticipatory repudiation provisions. The repudiating party would not face
the uncertainty as it does currently. If a statement is made that the nonrepudiating party interprets as constituting a repudiation, then the nonrepudiating party could no longer seek remedies without providing notice.
The non-repudiating party would first need to request adequate assurances,
and in this stage any misinterpretations could be corrected. In this way, the
repudiating party would be able to base its actions on defined expectations,
and it would not fear adverse actions as the result of a good-faith
communication regarding a difficulty in performance.
Similarly, the non-repudiating party would no longer have the ability or
incentive to strategically calculate its own communications. Upon the
manifestation of any uncertainty, the non-repudiating party's communication
would be required, and its content would be predefined. No additional rights
would be created for the non-repudiating party until the result of the request
for adequate assurances determined such rights.

87.
88.

Id. at 1171.
Id.
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C. The Importance of Communication in Working Relationships
A consequence of the incentive structure found in any statutory
framework is the effect that it has on how different entities interact. As
identified above, the anticipatory repudiation framework, as it now stands,
disincentivizes communication between parties to a contract when a problem
arises that could stand in the way of performance. The basic implication of
this effect on business relationships is easily perceived, but, over the last few
decades, the importance of communication, and its effect on business
relationships specifically, has moved to the forefront of contemporary
marketing research.89 The focus on business relationships in marketing has
been termed as “relationship marketing.”90
The recognition of relationship marketing led to the differentiation of
transactional exchange and relational exchange.91 Where transactional
exchange focuses on the short-term exchange, without any notion of
commitment beyond the single transaction, relational exchange involves
“long-term commitments . . . and the desire for collaboration.”92 The
perceived benefits of relationship marketing “include less need to advertise
to attract new customers, higher levels of repeat purchases, and stability of
income flow.”93 The products of these efforts to establish relationships
among business partners have been termed as relational assets.94 As a result,
some of the most valuable assets that a company possesses are difficult to
quantify, as they include the relationships with customers and suppliers.95
In recent years, the concepts of both relational exchange and
transactional exchange have been identified as non-exclusive concepts, but
the transactional exchange is basically the starting point and the relational
exchange is the added value that results when a company tries to appeal to
the needs of its relational assets.96 Simply put, the more a company tries to
appeal to the needs of its customers and suppliers in their interactions, the
more valuable those interactions become.
89.
90.
91.

92.

93.
94.

95.
96.

See Roger Bennett, Relationship Formation and Governance in Consumer Markets: Transactional
Analysis Versus the Behaviourist Approach, 12 J. MARKETING MGMT. 417 (1996).
Id.
Aurélia Lefaix-Durand & Robert Kozak, Integrating Transactional and Relational Exchange into
the Study of Exchange Orientation in Customer Relationships, 25 J. MARKETING MGMT. 1003, 1004
(2009).
Jagdish N. Sheth & Reshma H. Shah, Till Death Do Us Part . . . but Not Always: Six Antecedents
to a Customer’s Relational Preference in Buyer-Seller Exchanges, 32 INDUS. MARKETING MGMT.
627, 628 (2003).
Bennett, supra note 89, at 418.
See Robert F. Lusch, James R. Brown & Matthew O'Brien, Protecting Relational Assets: A Pre
and Post Field Study of a Horizontal Business Combination, 39 J. ACAD. MARKETING SCI. 175
(2011).
Id. at 191.
Lefaix-Durand & Kozak, supra note 91, at 1006.
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When applying notions of exchange orientation to interactions, it is
possible to break down exchanges into several factors that are important to
the development of relational assets.97 These factors are proximity,98
interdependence,99 time orientation,100 commitment,101 communication,102
cooperation,103 trust,104 regulation,105 coordination,106 and structure.107 The
more that one of these factors is focused on by a company, the more that
company is oriented toward relational exchanges.108
In other words, if a company focuses on the factors that promote the
value of its relational assets, it has adopted a strategy of fostering relational
assets, and those assets will grow in value. However, when some of the
factors are overlooked or inappropriately focused on, the orientation of the
company can become misaligned.109 For example, if a company strives to
foster relationships, but it does not take into consideration the concept of
trust, it cannot hope to realize the full extent of the fruits of its efforts
regarding the other factors. The concept is very similar to the “weakest link”
97.
98.

99.

100.

101.

102.

103.

104.

105.

106.

107.

108.
109.

Id.
Id. at 1007 (defining proximity as applying to the closeness that firms experience both spatially and
culturally; the more that a firm caters to a relational asset in terms of proximity, the greater the
added value).
Id. (defining interdependence as emerging between firms as time goes by and repeated exchanges
take place; along with repeated exchanges, irreplaceability of a trade partner increases
interdependence, and the more interdependence grows between relational assets, the greater the
added value).
Id. (defining time orientation as a determination of how much a company positions itself to establish
long-term relationships with its business partners; the more a company focuses on long-term
interactions with a relational asset, the greater the added value).
Id. at 1007–08 (defining commitment as involving notions of putting the customer first and taking
short-term losses when the alternative is sacrificing customer satisfaction; the more a company
focuses on commitment, the greater the added value).
Id. at 1008 (defining communication as the sharing of information that is frequent, reliable, relevant,
and timely; the more a company focuses on efforts to promote the sharing of information, the greater
the added value).
Id. (defining cooperation as the voluntary undertaking of actions to achieve similar or
complimentary goals to those of a trade partner; the more a company focuses on undertaking similar
goals to those of a trade partner, the greater the added value).
Id.(defining trust as the perceived ability to rely on a trade partner; this stems from a number of
other factors, including the values of the company, predictability, and competence; the more a
company focuses on a reputation that instills trust, the greater the added value in its transactions
with those business relationships).
Id. at 1008–09 (defining regulation as dealing with the attitudes of a company relating to how it
encourages actions in those around it; the more coercive the company, the less likely a trade partner
is to respond well; the less coercive and more informal, the greater the added value).
Id. at 1009 (defining coordination as a measure of how integrated trade partners are; if technological
integration makes transactional interactions less complicated, then there is a greater value added to
transactions with that relational asset).
Id. at 1009–10 (defining structure as the idea that firms exist and operate within a network of other
firms, which are all interconnected; existing within the same strong network as a relational asset
improves the value of that relationship).
Id. at 1006–07.
Id. at 1017.
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analogy. A company’s exchange orientation is relationship-oriented only to
the extent of its focus on the least prioritized factor.
In regard to the present discussion regarding anticipatory repudiation,
there are two specific consequences identified as a result of interactions under
the current U.C.C. framework. The first is a disincentive to communicate,
while the second is the breach of a contract. A failure to communicate
obviously speaks to the communication factor of exchange orientation, while
a breach of contract relates to trust and possibly commitment. Additionally,
a request for adequate assurances falls under the regulation factor, as the
request is a legal compulsory tool, which is designed and utilized to elicit an
action on the part of a trade partner.
In the absence of anticipatory repudiation, the worst case scenario
regarding relational assets is a degradation of the trust and commitment
factors, and a breach of contract is the worst-case scenario as a result of the
interaction. When anticipatory repudiation becomes a factor, then there are
further concerns. The degradation of the trust and commitment factors
remain, but additional factors suffer as well.
If the insecure party requests adequate assurances, it degrades the
regulation parameter, as that party is coercing action from the potentially
repudiating party through statutorily defined methods. This action may not
always harm the relationship, but, in those instances when it is abused or used
excessively, it will.
In any situation involving anticipatory repudiation, the communication
factor clearly takes punishment from all sides. As outlined above, both
parties have a disincentive to openly communicate.
Even those
communications that do take place are far from the open sharing of reliable
information that enhances relationships.
In effect, when anticipatory repudiation under the U.C.C. applies to a
specific trade relationship, the orientation of that relationship inherently
becomes misaligned. Fruits of efforts to focus on relationship marketing
cannot be fully realized due to inherent disincentives.
IV. CONCLUSION
Anticipatory repudiation effectively provides one-sided protection to an
insecure or non-repudiating party of a contract, while providing little or no
protection to a party whose future performance of an obligation under a
contract is in question. It disincentivizes communication between trade
partners, and it creates an artificial incentive framework in which a party
must make decisions. A party facing difficulty in the performance of its
obligations can receive no benefit from a communication while anticipatory
repudiation remains applicable. Additionally, it can stand as a barrier to
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relationship marketing, as its effect on the factors important to relational
exchanges devalues relational assets.
Despite a failure by experts in the field to promote any meaningful
changes to anticipatory repudiation under the U.C.C., a mandatory request
for adequate assurances would help to resolve the problems found in
anticipatory repudiation, which is effectively a barrier to communication.

